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Abstract

The North American model of workplace law is broken, characterized by declining frequency of collective
bargaining, high levels of non-compliance with employment regulation, and political deadlock. This paper
explores whether the theory of “decentred regulation” offers useful insights into the challenge of improving
compliance with employment standards laws. It argues that the dominant political perspective on workplace
regulation today is managerialist. Politicians with a managerialist orientation reject both the pluralist idea that
collective bargaining is always preferred and the neoclassical view that it never is. Managerialists accept a role
for employment regulation and unions, particularly in dealing with recalcitrant employers who mistreat their
employees. The fact that managerialists and pluralists agree on this latter point creates a space for potential
movement on workplace law reform. A law that encourages “high road” employment practices, while fasttracking access to collective bargaining for “low road” employers could encourage greater compliance with
employment regulation, while also facilitating collective bargaining at high-risk workplaces. This article
examines lessons from scholarship on decentred regulation for the design of a legal model capable of
achieving these results. In particular, it develops and assesses a dual regulatory stream model that restricts
existing rights of employers to resist their employees’ efforts to unionize once they have been found in
violation of targeted employment regulation.
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A Model of Responsive Workplace Law
DAVID J. DOOREY *
The North American model of workplace law is broken, characterized by declining frequency
of collective bargaining, high levels of non-compliance with employment regulation, and
political deadlock. This paper explores whether the theory of “decentred regulation” offers
useful insights into the challenge of improving compliance with employment standards laws.
It argues that the dominant political perspective on workplace regulation today is managerialist.
Politicians with a managerialist orientation reject both the pluralist idea that collective bargaining is always preferred and the neoclassical view that it never is. Managerialists accept
a role for employment regulation and unions, particularly in dealing with recalcitrant
employers who mistreat their employees. The fact that managerialists and pluralists agree
on this latter point creates a space for potential movement on workplace law reform. A law
that encourages “high road” employment practices, while fast-tracking access to collective
bargaining for “low road” employers could encourage greater compliance with employment
regulation, while also facilitating collective bargaining at high-risk workplaces. This article
examines lessons from scholarship on decentred regulation for the design of a legal model
capable of achieving these results. In particular, it develops and assesses a dual regulatory
stream model that restricts existing rights of employers to resist their employees’ efforts to
unionize once they have been found in violation of targeted employment regulation.
On ne respecte plus le modèle nord-américain du droit du travail, en raison d’une fréquence
à la baisse des négociations collectives, d’un degré élevé de non conformité aux règlements
sur l’emploi et d’une impasse politique. Cet article se demande si la théorie de la
« réglementation décentralisée » procure des points de vue utiles quant au défi d’améliorer
la conformité aux lois sur les normes du travail. Il fait valoir que, de nos jours, la perspective
politique dominante sur la réglementation du travail est gestionnariste. Les politiciens ayant
une orientation gestionnariste rejettent à la fois l’idée pluraliste voulant que les négociations
collectives soient toujours préférables et le point de vue néoclassique voulant qu’elles ne
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le soient jamais. Les gestionnaristes admettent l’utilité des règlements sur l’emploi et des
syndicats, plus particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agit de traiter avec des employeurs récalcitrants
qui maltraitent leur employés. Le fait que les gestionnaristes et les pluralistes s’entendent
sur ce qui précède pourrait favoriser une réforme du droit du travail. Un droit privilégiant des
pratiques d’emploi « normalisées » tout en accélérant l’accès aux conventions collectives
pour les employeurs « non conformes » pourrait entraîner une plus grande conformité aux
règlements sur l’emploi, tout en facilitant la négociation collective dans les lieux de travail
à risque élevé. Cet article se penche sur les leçons tirées de la recherche universitaire sur
la réglementation décentralisée pour l’élaboration d’un modèle juridique pouvant atteindre
ces résultats. En particulier, il élabore et évalue un modèle réglementaire à double courant
qui restreint le droit actuel des employeurs de résister aux efforts de syndicalisation de leurs
employés lorsqu’il a été constaté qu’ils ont violé la réglementation d’emploi visée.
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AS THE TWENTIETH CENTURY drew to a close, there was much soul searching
within academic and labour policy circles about the future of workplace law.1
This period of reflection revealed an emerging consensus that the old ways of
governing work were no longer effective—if ever they had been—and that new
approaches were necessary. Evidence of the failure of workplace law included
high levels of non-compliance with employment standards legislation,2 persistent
inequality of opportunities and compensation for women and minority groups,3
alarming and growing levels of income inequality,4 and the falling percentage
of workers represented by unions.5 If there was widespread agreement that the
existing approach to workplace law in Canada and the United States was deficient,
there was—and is—little consensus on how to fix it. There is no shortage of ideas.
However, political fragmentation and indifference has meant that few proposals
have advanced beyond the initial debate stage, and that those that have advanced

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

Katherine VW Stone, “A Labor Law for the Digital Era: The Future of Labor and
Employment Law in the United States” in Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Seth D Harris & Orly
Lobel, eds, Labor and Employment Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009)
689; Bob Hepple, “The Future of Labour Law” (1995) 24:4 Indus LJ 303; Chris Engels
& Manfred Weiss, Labour Law and Industrial Relations at the Turn of the Century: Liber
Amicorum in Honour of Professor Roger Blanpain (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1998); John DR Craig & S Michael Lynk, eds, Globalization and the Future of Labour Law
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Catherine Barnard, Simon Deakin
& Gillian S Morris, eds, The Future of Labour Law: Liber Amicorum Sir Bob Hepple, Q.C.
(Oxford: Hart, 2004); Stewart J Schwab, “Predicting the Future of Employment Law:
Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?” (2001) 76:1 Ind LJ 29.
See e.g. Harry W Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century
(Ottawa: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, 2006) at 190-95 [Arthurs,
Fairness at Work] (noting that 75% of federally regulated employers are in violation of
federal employment standards laws); Roy J Adams, “Employment Standards in Ontario: An
Industrial Relations Systems Analysis” (1987) 42:1 RI 46; and Mark P Thomas, Regulating
Flexibility: The Political Economy of Employment Standards (Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press, 2009).
See e.g. Sheila Block, Ontario’s Growing Gap: The Role of Race and Gender (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010).
See Kerry Rittich, “Between Workers’ Rights and Flexibility: Labor Law in an Uncertain
World” (2010) 54 Saint Louis ULJ 565 at 567; Michael Lynk, “Labour Law and the New
Inequality” (2009) 15 Just Lab 125 at 129.
Lance Compa, Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States under
International Human Rights Standards (August 2000), online: Human Rights Watch <http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2000/uslabor/>; Cynthia L Estlund, “The Ossification of Labor Law”
(2002) 102:6 Colum L Rev 1527 [Estlund, “Ossification”]; Richard B Freeman & Lawrence
F Katz, “Rising Wage Inequality: The United States vs Other Advanced Countries” in
Richard B Freeman, ed, Working Under Different Rules (New York: Russell Sage, 1994) 29;
Lynk, ibid.
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represent only modest tinkering, leading to little if any measurable change in
working conditions.
The “ossification” of workplace law in North America has led some scholars
to investigate the potential contribution of a strand of legal theory known as
“decentred regulation,” which is popular in other spheres of governance.6
Decentred approaches to regulation come armed with fresh names, such as “new
governance,”7 “responsive regulation,”8 and “reflexive law.”9 A central observation
shared by the various strands that fall under the umbrella of decentred regulation
is the state’s frequent incapacity to “command” changes in business behaviour
through the threat of sanctions. At the same time, decentred regulation points
to the many forces other than the state that influence behavioural norms. It
emphasizes the potential for the state to use regulation to harness private power
so as to provoke and steer self-reflection and self-regulation in ways that further
state objectives.
This article explores whether there are useful lessons in decentred regulation
scholarship for workplace law reform. My interest is in a particular form of
decentred regulation, which I will label “instrumental decentred regulation.” It is
instrumental because it is policy-driven, state-made law intended to achieve public
policy objectives. It is useful to make this explicit, since decentred regulation is
often (mis)understood as synonymous with corporate “self-regulation” and an
agenda promoting a lesser state role in the governance of business. As such, it
is easily dismissed or ignored by those who favour more, not less, government
6.
7.

8.

9.

Estlund, ibid.
Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 342 [Lobel, “Renew Deal”];
Orly Lobel, “Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev
498 [Lobel, “Setting the Agenda”]; Cynthia Estlund, “Corporate Self-Regulation and the
Future of Workplace Governance” (2009) 84:2 Chicago-Kent L Rev 617 at 622 [Estlund,
“Self Regulation”]; Cynthia Estlund, Regoverning the Workplace: From Self-Regulation to CoRegulation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) [Estlund, Regoverning].
Phillippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law
(New Brunswick, NJ: Harper Torch Books, 1978); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Gunther Teubner, “Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law” (1983) 17:2 Law &
Soc’y Rev 239 [Teubner, “Modern Law”]; Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, Reflexive Labour
Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation (Boston: Kluwer Law and
Taxation, 1994); David Doorey, “Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices
Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation” (2005) 43:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 353
[Doorey, “Who Made That”]; Eric W Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89:4 Nw
UL Rev 1227; Michael C Dorf, “The Domain of Reflexive Law,” Book Review of Regulating
Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm by Jean L Cohen, (2003) 103:2 Colum L Rev 384.
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oversight of business activities. Here, instrumental decentred regulation describes
an approach to governance that is guided by a bundle of insights into the
relationship between legal signals and behavioural norms, not by any particularly
normative political agenda. To use workplace law as an example, the insights it
draws on can be deployed to relax or strengthen employment standards and to
promote or discourage collective bargaining.
In Part I, the article begins by exploring common themes that define the
decentred approach to regulation. It then considers, in Part II, the implications
of the decentred approach for the design of business regulation and for research
agendas in regulatory studies. Part III describes four regulatory tools commonly
associated with the decentred approach. The final two parts of the article are
devoted to a discussion of how the insights drawn from the decentred regulatory
literature could be deployed to improve compliance with employment standards
legislation in Canada.
Part IV examines the contemporary political economy of workplace law
reform and argues that the dominant political perspective in Canada today is best
understood as managerialist. This perspective is ideologically situated somewhere
between the industrial pluralist perspective, which favours a strong state and
collective bargaining, and the neoclassicalist perspective, which advocates
for limited government intervention in labour markets and against collective
bargaining. Those who hold the managerialist perspective believe the decision
by workers to unionize is a rational and acceptable response by workers to
perceived mistreatment by employers, but that unionization is neither necessary
nor beneficial in cases where employers act responsibly in their dealings with
employees. Therefore, in contrast to the pluralist perspective, managerialists do
not believe the state should encourage collective bargaining as a preferred policy
model. However, contrary to the position of neoclassicalists, managerialists
do accept a role for the state in ensuring that workers have access to collective
bargaining when they feel mistreated.
Policies that fit within the managerialist worldview have a greater chance
nowadays to gain political traction than those that speak only to pluralists or to
neoclassicalists. Therefore, Part V of the paper considers a package of regulatory
reforms to improve employment standards compliance that draw on insights
from decentred regulatory theory and that are consistent with the mangerialist
worldview of the appropriate role of employment and labour law. The objective
is to design a regime that would steer employers onto a “high road” of progressive
human resource management practices by better protecting workers whose
employers opt for the “low road.” Our existing legal model is deficient in both
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regards. The alternative model discussed here incentivizes high road employment
practices (including compliance with key employment law standards) while
better enabling employees of low road employers to access collective bargaining.
This model deploys the concept of a dual regulatory stream, drawn from the
literature on decentred regulation, which assigns contrasting bundles of rights
and obligations to employers depending upon the degree to which they comply
with the state’s code of responsible employment practices. This article is cautiously
optimistic about the potential contribution of insights from decentred regulatory
theory to the challenges of reforming workplace law in North America, and
concludes by recommending further debate about and exploration of the ideas
presented in the article.

I. THE DECENTRED UNDERSTANDING OF REGULATION
Decentred regulation and new governance are umbrella terms intended to capture
a subset of regulatory strands that share key premises or insights, which in turn
guide their advocates towards a similar set of regulatory prescriptions.10
Decentred regulation is often positioned as the alternative to more direct,
top-down Command-and-Control (CAC) regulation. CAC regulation is
frequently described in the literature on decentred regulatory theory as too rigid
and blunt an instrument to effectively influence behaviour in complex modern
societies. The reasons given for the failure of CAC regulation vary. In its most
radical form, the argument forms a key component of autopoeitic systems theory,
as developed by Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, among others.11 North
American critics of CAC rely less on systems theory, but argue that modern
business has become too powerful and mobile, and that many social problems
10. The works of Julia Black (decentred regulation) and Orly Lobel (new governance) are
particularly useful in synthesizing this literature. See Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World”
(2001) 54 Curr Legal Problems 103 [Black, “Decentring”]; Julia Black, “Critical Reflections
on Regulation” (2002) 27 Austl J Legal Phil 1; Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation,
Part I” (2000) 20:4 Oxford J Legal Stud 597 [Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation”]; Lobel,
“Renew Deal,” supra note 7; Orly Lobel, “National Regulation in a Global Economy: New
Governance Approaches to 21st Century Work Law” in Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, Seth D
Harris & Orly Lobel, eds, Labor & Employment Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2009) 630 [Lobel, “New Governance”]; Lobel, “Setting the Agenda,” supra note 7.
11. Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, translated by Stephen Holmes & Charles
Larmore (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Gunther Teubner, Law as an
Autopoietic System, translated by Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)
[Teubner, Autopoietic System].
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have become too complex to govern through a hierarchical legal system based on
government commands backed by a threat of monetary sanctions.12
In the decentred account, legal systems evolve from an initial focus on
formal laws that support the basic requirements of private ordering, including
contract and property law, to a system of substantive legal regulation in which the
state deploys law in active pursuit of social and economic policies.13 Inevitably,
society’s problems become too complex for the substantive legal regime to
manage, or subsystems within societies become over-legalized, creating a “crisis”
of the regulatory state.14 At this point, a further evolution towards a third model
of governance occurs in which the state recognizes its incapacity to engineer
specific policy objectives through an array of CAC regulation and looks outwards
towards other potential sources of governance that might be harnessed in pursuit
of the state’s policy objectives.15
A. COMMON THEMES THAT DEFINE THE DECENTRED UNDERSTANDING OF
REGULATION

This bare-bones account of the evolutionary nature of law is sufficient to
demonstrate the imperative in decentred literature for a realignment of the form
of legal commands, as explained by Julia Black:
CAC regulation posits a particular role for the state against which the “decentring”
analysis is counterposed. It is “centred” in that it assumes the state to have the
capacity to command and control, to be the only commander and controller,
and to be potentially effective in commanding and controlling. It is assumed to
be unilateral in its approach (governments telling, others doing), based on simple
cause-effect relations, and envisaging a linear progression from policy formation
through to implementation. Its failings are variously identified as being, inter
alia, that the instruments used (laws backed by sanctions) are inappropriate and
unsophisticated (instrument failure), that government has insufficient knowledge to
be able to identify the causes of problems, to design solutions that are appropriate,
and to identify non-compliance (information failure), that implementation of the

12. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 76.
13. For an account of the evolutionary trajectory of legal systems in reflexive law, see Teubner,
“Modern Law,” supra note 9. Orly Lobel sets out a similar narrative in her description of new
governance theory in Lobel, supra note 10 at 381-86. See also William M Sage, “Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care” (1999) 99:7 Colum L
Rev 1701; Orts, supra note 9; Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an
Era of Self-Regulation” (2005) 105:2 Colum L Rev 319.
14. Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9.
15. Gunther Teubner, “Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death Foretold” (1992) 1:4 Soc & Leg
Stud 451 at 463; Orts, supra note 9 at 1260.
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regulation is inadequate (implementation failure), and/or that those being regulated
are insufficiently inclined to comply, and those doing the regulating are insufficiently
inclined to comply (motivation failure).16

Black identifies a number of common insights or “aspects” that together comprise
a decentred understanding of regulation.17
First, the causes of modern social problems are said to be complex and
shaped by interactions between a variety of forces that are poorly understood.18
Second, no one actor, certainly not the state, possesses the knowledge or expertise
to understand how normative behaviour is determined in light of this complexity
(there is “fragmented knowledge”).19 Third, there is a plurality of sources of
normative behaviour. Formal, state-based law is one source, but often other
social or economic forces are equally significant to, or more significant than,
government regulation as determinants of behaviour.20 Thus, decentrists are also
legal pluralists.
Fourth, a decentred orientation to regulation recognizes that the targets
of regulation are complex, autonomous actors with their own objectives,
worldviews, and discourses. Since lawmakers cannot possibly know how every
actor perceives his or her environment and, in any event, the targets of regulation
are not homogeneous in this regard, regulation will cause behavioural changes and
outcomes that are unintended.21 Decentred regulatory theory therefore requires
the state to be engaged in a process of continuous learning through feedback
loops: The state transmits legal signals, observes how actors and subsystems react,
seeks input and counsel from knowledgeable actors, and then adjusts the signals
accordingly in a process of ongoing, dynamic communication.22
16. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 106.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid at 106-07. See also Patrick Capps & Henrik Palmer Olsen, “Legal Autonomy and
Reflexive Rationality in Complex Societies” (2002) 11:4 Soc & Leg Stud 547 at 551.
19. Orly Lobel notes that a premise of the new governance model is “that no one institution
possesses the ability to regulate all aspects of contemporary public life.” See “Renew Deal,”
supra note 7 at 380; See also Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation,” supra note 10 at 602.
20. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 108. See also Lobel, ibid at 373, explaining that a new
governance approach is a regime “based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens
from passive to active roles. The exercise of normative authority is pluralized.”
21. Gunther Teubner notes that because under a regime of reflexive law the “legal control of
social action is indirect and abstract,” it may produce unpredictable outcomes. See “Modern
Law,” supra note 9 at 255.
22. See e.g. Lobel, “Renew Deal,” supra note 7 at 377 (noting that new governance “advocates
… the adoption of cooperative governance based on continuous interaction and sharing of
responsibility”); Miriam Hechler Baer, “Governing Corporate Compliance” (2009) 50:4
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A fifth aspect of a decentred approach to regulation is the observation that
regulation fosters and relies upon interdependencies between regulator and
regulated. Rather than conceiving of the state as commander and the targets
of regulation as commanded in a linear, hierarchical relationship, a decentred
orientation embraces the notion that “interdependencies and interactions exist
between government and social actors” and that each is dependent on the other
for the resolution of complex social problems.23
Last, Black explains that a decentred approach to regulation involves the
“collaps[ing] of the public/private distinction” and a “rethinking of the role of
formal authority in governance and regulation.”24 It requires the state to move
towards a regulatory strategy that encourages self-reflection and continuous
learning by the targets of regulation. In addition, it influences the contextual
conditions of self-regulation and co-regulation with the aim of encouraging the
private creation of substantive norms from the periphery of social and economic
interactions by discovering ways to use law to influence communications and
interactions between private actors.25
B. DECENTRED REGULATION AS INSTRUMENTAL LAW

The phrase “regulated self-regulation,” often associated with the decentred
approach, usefully captures a key philosophical foundation of the decentred
orientation.26 First, it emphasizes that regulation includes more than just orders

23.

24.
25.
26.

BCL Rev 949 at 1004; Colin J Bennett & Michael Howlett, “The Lessons of Learning:
Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change” (1992) 25 Pol’y Sci 275 at 276
(noting that “states can learn from their experiences and … can modify their present actions
on the basis of their interpretation of how previous actions have fared in the past”); and
Capps & Olsen, supra note 18 at 550.
Jan Kooiman argues that there is a shift from the conception of regulation as “‘one-way
traffic’ from those governing to those governed” and towards “a ‘two-way traffic’ model
in which aspects, qualities, problems and opportunities of both the governing system
and the system to be governed are taken into account.” See “Social-Political Governance:
Introduction” in Jan Kooiman, ed, Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions
(London, UK: SAGE, 1993) 1 at 4.
Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 110.
Ibid at 112; Teubner, supra note 11 at 67.
The idea that states should “regulate self-regulation” for instrumental purposes is now
a common theme in decentred regulation scholarship. Cynthia Estlund notes that “law
can effectively regulate complex organizations in modern society only by shaping those
organizations’ own processes of self-regulation and inducing organizations to internalize
public values. Hence the turn to what is sometimes called the regulation of self-regulation.”
See “Who Mops the Floor at the Fortune 500: Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage
Workplace” (2008) Lewis & Clark L Rev 671 at 682.
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issued by governments and backed by state-imposed penalties; it also includes
private systems of rules that emerge outside of the state. This includes norms
developed through attempts by firms to self-regulate, perhaps in response to
incentives and risks introduced by government regulation, as well as norms that
emerge through contestation, negotiation, conflict, and dialogue between firms
and others actors and networks of actors.27
Secondly, the phrase “regulated self-regulation,” or “enforced self-regulation,”
reminds us that, in the decentred approach to regulation, the state continues to
play a significant role and continues to pursue public policy objectives.28 The state
still decides what policies to pursue. Decentred regulation, like CAC regulation,
is a form of instrumental law. There is a big difference between self-regulation
and decentred regulation, although this point is often misunderstood, as Bradley
C. Karkkainen has noted:
One of the persistent and pervasive misconceptions about New Governance is that
it is wholly reliant on “soft law” mechanisms, and therefore ultimately dependent
on the good intentions and voluntary actions of parties who heretofore have shown
little inclination toward acting in the desired directions. On those grounds, it is
easily dismissed by its misinformed critics as so much wishful thinking.29

Self-regulation describes self-imposed and self-defined rules by private actors that
may or may not be consistent with government policy objectives, and which
may or may not be backed by some form of legal, moral, social, or market-based
sanction.30 Decentred regulation, on the other hand, is government regulation
in pursuit of public policy objectives, although the form of regulation that is
expected to be effective varies from that in a CAC regime. This distinction is due
to the very different perceptions of the operational relationship between legal
signals and regulated actors’ behaviour.31
27. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at ch 5.
28. Lobel, “Setting the Agenda,” supra note 7 at 502 (“[new governance scholars] refuse to
abandon the role of an active state in democracy”); See discussion of enforced self-regulation
in Ayres & Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 8 at ch 4.
29. “‘New Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as an Antidote to
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89:2 Minn L Rev 471 at 488-89.
30. See Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (LSE Legal Stud Working
Paper No 15, 2007), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1033322>
(provides a discussion of the distinction between state-based regulation that aims to influence
behaviour indirectly and purely private regulatory systems in which the state plays no direct
role).
31. Simon Deakin & Ralf Rogowski, “Reflexive Labour Law, Capabilities, and the Future of
Social Europe” (University of Warwick School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 04,
2011) at 7, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780922>.
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY DESIGN AND RESEARCH
A decentred approach to regulation would redefine and redeploy the range
of appropriate regulatory tools that have traditionally been used in regimes
characterized by CAC. This has implications not only for regulatory design, but
also for research in regulation, including in workplace law. I will focus on three
key insights associated with the decentered regulatory perspective: (1) an emphasis
on how regulation can be used to influence the decision-making processes within
regulated firms; (2) an awareness that non-state actors and networks of actors
might be harnessed in pursuit of public policy goals; and (3) the potential benefits
of risk-based regulation towards influencing firm behaviour.
A. INTERNAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AS A TARGET FOR REGULATION

Decentred regulatory theory perceives the process through which legal signals
penetrate firms’ decision-making processes as highly complex. Mechanisms,
pressures, incentives, personalities, cultures, social norms, histories, and discourses
within firms muddy legal signals or translate them to fit better with the firm’s
culture or the worldview of its key personnel. To use the language of reflexive
legal theory, a message transmitted from the legal subsystem to the economic
subsystem will be reinterpreted according to the particular binary code used
within the economic subsystem.32 The legal signal “pay the minimum wage,” for
example, may be reinterpreted by economic actors according to the language of
the economic subsystem—pay or do not pay, profit or do not profit.33 Perceived
from the perspective of CAC regulation, the failure of the command—pay
the minimum wage—reflects a failure of enforcement. This leads to proposed
solutions such as raising fines for non-compliance or ensuring more effective
enforcement by government inspectors. The belief is that raising the anticipated
financial costs of non-compliance will improve the likelihood that otherwise
non-compliant employers will then choose to comply.
A decentred approach to the problem might also support higher fines and
better enforcement, particularly for persistent offenders,34 but holds out little
32. Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9.
33. See, for example, the discussion in Hugh Collins, Book Review of Reflexive Labour
Law: Studies in Industrial Relations and Employment Regulation by Ralf Rogowski & Ton
Wilthagen, eds, (1998) 61:6 Mod L Rev 916 [Collins, Book Review].
34. For example, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite proposed the idea of the ‘benign big gun,’
by which they meant that a responsive regulatory model required serious sanctions be in
place to punish persistent offenders and to act as the ultimate incentive for firms to opt for
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hope that this alone will transform overall compliance levels. As Gunther Teubner
asserts, a direct legal command like “pay the minimum wage” has “little chance
of being obeyed when it comes into direct conflict with the profit motive.”35
The higher the fines for non-compliance, the greater the incentive for firms to
hide their non-compliance from the state or to exit the regulating jurisdiction,
if feasible. Conscious of these limits of CAC regulation, decentrists emphasize
strategies intended to realign the firms’ economic interests with the state’s interest
in improving compliance with the legal standards. In Philip Selznick’s words, the
objective is to use regulation to get companies “to want to do what they should do.”36
Note that in this scenario, the state does not cease to set hard standards; it
still determines whether a minimum wage is appropriate and what it should be.
Instrumental decentred regulation does not mean replacing fixed government
standards with voluntary self-regulation. However, decentrists would propose
a different way of thinking about how the legal signals should be deployed in
order to effect compliance. A fundamental objective of a decentred regulatory
strategy is to infiltrate the firms’ decision-making matrices and erect signposts
that direct decision-makers towards the state’s desired course of action. That is
why a common theme found in the decentred scholarship is the potential for
regulation to re-orientate firms’ internal management systems and decisionmaking processes by influencing the context and processes through which
complex decisions are made.37
Black observes, for example, that “one of the roles of reflexive law is to set the
decision-making procedures within organizations in such a way that the goals of

the more cooperative regulatory options. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8 at 47-49.
See also Collins, Book Review, ibid at 65; Estlund, “Self-Regulation,” supra note 7 at 624
(“effective self-regulation depends on maintaining a serious background threat of public
enforcement”); Lobel, “New Governance,” supra note 10 at 638-39; David A Dana, “The
New ‘Contractarian’ Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) 1 U Ill L Rev 35 at
47 (noting that new governance-style regulatory models still depend upon the existence of
a strong government penalty to act as a threat to those businesses that do not participate
meaningfully in the new approach).
35. Teubner, Autopoietic System, supra note 11 at 91.
36. The Communitarian Persuasion (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002) at 102;
See also Christine Parker, “Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountatbility for Corporate Social
Responsibility” in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds, The New
Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, UK:
Cambidge University Press, 2007) 207 at 208; Christine Parker, The Open Corporation:
Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
37. See e.g. Deakin & Rogowski, supra note 31 at 6.
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public policy are achieved.”38 Scott notes similarly that “the modest conception
of law’s capabilities [in decentred regulatory theory] has led to a concern with
targeting the internal management systems of regulated entities in order to
secure compliance with regulatory goals.”39 Eric W. Orts identified as a reflexive
law strategy the aim of “channeling communications within the organizational
structure of social institutions” with the expectation that influencing how
information is gathered and used in an organization can influence how
organizations respond to that information.40
One example of a regulatory model that seeks to improve compliance
with government standards by targeting the design and implementation of
internal management systems is the American Federal Sentencing Guidelines
for Organizations.41 The Guidelines allow for lesser sentences for organizations
that have committed legal violations but had implemented internal compliance
systems that meet the government’s established standards. The government
standards for an “effective compliance program” include: (1) adoption of codes
of conduct that include as a minimum compliance with all applicable laws;
(2) communication and training of employees on the content of the code; (3)
designation of a senior company official as responsible for compliance with
the code; (4) adoption of systems designed to monitor the effectiveness of the
code’s implementation; (5) adoption of incentives and disciplinary procedures
designed to encourage compliance and respond to violations discovered; and (6)
adoption of systems that enable confidential reporting without fear of reprisals.42
The objective was to steer firms towards implementing systems the state believed
would improve compliance by offering the ‘carrot’ of reduced penalties.
The concern with internal decision-making processes affects both the form
of proposed regulation and the research agenda for lawmakers and regulatory

38. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 127.
39. Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State” in
Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory
Reforms for the Age of Governance (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004) 145 at 152.
40. Orts, supra note 9 at 1267; See also Daniel J Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental
Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance” (1999) 23:2 Harv Envtl L Rev 441 at 448
(noting how reflexive law seeks to “strengthen ‘reflexion mechanisms’ within the [targeted]
entity to encourage the desired behaviour”).
41. See discussion in Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and
Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiy Press, 2002) at 259-61; Estlund, Regoverning,
supra note 7 at 77-78.
42. Ibid.
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scholars. Regulation that looks inside the managerial “black box,” to borrow
Cynthia Estlund’s phrase, takes on greater prominence.43 Researchers are guided
towards questions that explore internal firm dynamics and cultures and how
they interact with external environment forces, such as markets, culture, and
business risks. The process requires a close examination of how decisions are
made within organizations and of questions such as: Whose job is it to learn
what the employment standards are and to decide whether those rules will be
complied with throughout an organization? How is information about legal rules
received and transmitted within organizations? What motivates firms’ decision
makers, and how might those motivations be altered to produce a different set
of incentives? A shift towards decentred regulation therefore focusses more on
the dynamics of internal managerial processes and their impact on performance
outcomes than is common in a CAC approach.
B. HARNESSING
REGULATION

NON-STATE

ACTORS

AND

NETWORKS

THROUGH

Legal pluralism has experienced a rebirth in parallel with the recent interest
in decentred approaches to regulation.44 The lens of legal pluralism opens our
eyes to the complex environment in which many firms operate and to the
many sources of push and pull that act upon firms at any given moment. These
sources of influence are central to understanding why firms behave as they do.
As Roderick A. Macdonald has noted, the rediscovery of legal pluralism means
that “to understand the role that State law actually plays in a given social field,
it is necessary to understand the character and operation of multiple regimes of
unofficial law in the same field.”45
This in turn requires the state to learn about those private actors that
have an interest in firm behaviour in particular spheres, such as workplace
practices. Unions are one such type of actor, but legal clinics, worker centres,
faith-based organizations, activist shareholders, non-government organizations,
and consumers might also be interested in labour practices. Andrew Dunsmire
explains the regulatory technique of putting private sources of pressure to work in
pursuit of government objectives as “collibration,” the goal of which is as follows:

43. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 133.
44. Orly Lobel notes that the new governance approach is “based on engaging multiple actors
and shifting citizens from passive to active roles. The exercise of normative authority is
pluralized.” See “Renew Deal,” supra note 7 at 373.
45. Roderick A Macdonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal
Pluralism” (1998) 15:1 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 69 at 77.
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[T]o identify, in any area of interest, what antagonistic forces already operate, what
… configuration presently obtains, and what intervention would help create a more
desirable position … not by … laying down a standard or a prohibition … but by
giving that degree of ad hoc support to the side which needs it as will do the trick.46

All of the firms’ stakeholders—friend and foe—become potential sources of
influence that might be put to use to help the state achieve its public policy goals.
Again, this emphasis on the potential role of non-state actors in shaping
business behaviour influences not only the form of potentially viable regulation
but also the sort of research questions lawmakers and scholars should explore. The
various actors, or stakeholders, must be mapped to identify their place and role
within the web of influence in the particular sphere of conduct being targeted by
the state. The nature of the relationship between the many private actors and the
firms needs to be investigated, as do the relationships among the various actors.
By investigating and mapping these relationships, the decentrist can then begin
to identify what legal signals deployed into the milieu might promote the sorts of
changes in behaviour the state desires.
C. INJECTING RISK AS A REGULATORY TOOL

The third insight flows from the first two. By recognizing that firms can be
induced or provoked by external pressures and forces to make useful changes
to their internal management systems, a decentred orientation alerts us to the
possibility of using risk as a regulatory tool. When managers identify risks to
the firms’ economic objectives (e.g., brand reputation, market share, share price,
or profitability), or to their own personal interests and ambitions (e.g., poor
performance evaluations, loss of bonuses, discipline, or dismissal), we anticipate
that they will take steps to eliminate or reduce those risks. In theory, these
risk management responses may include steps that improve the likelihood of
compliance with the state’s own policy objectives. This creates the possibility of
using regulation to agitate internal management systems or to induce them to
change by “injecting risk.”47
Michael Power notes that risk management processes seek to normalize or
embed greater responsiveness to potential sources of risk into the habits and
routines of firms.48 By deploying legal signals that economic actors will perceive as
46. “Modes of Governance” in Jan Kooiman, ed, Modern Governance: New Government-Society
Interactions (London, UK: SAGE, 1993) at 34; See also Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 127.
47. Doorey, “Who Made That,” supra note 9.
48. “Risk Management and the Responsible Organization” in Richard V Ericson & Aaron
Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 145 at 153.
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the introduction of a new risk, the state can activate risk management responses
that might cause greater attentiveness to government regulatory standards to be
embedded as a norm. The most common example of this, discussed in more detail
below, is through information disclosure regulation. Requiring firms to collect
and disclose information that, once made public, could harm firm reputation or
be used by antagonistic actors to embarrass the firm may cause firms to design new
systems to reduce the risk associated with the information disclosure.49 This might
include better internal monitoring of potentially harmful practices and greater
responsiveness to those practices once uncovered. In this way, information
disclosure regulation can help achieve public policy objectives indirectly.50
Using risk to influence internal management systems would also require a
different sort of research agenda for lawmakers and workplace law scholars than
what they have been used to. First, they would need to identify the sources of
risk, or more specifically, what the targeted firms perceive as the sources of risk
related to labour practices. Second, they would have to explore how risk signals,
or how the presence of external risks, penetrate the firms’ decision-making
apparatus. How do managers become aware of risks and monitor them? Third,
they would be interested in learning how knowledge of the risk signals translates
into action within a firm: What sorts of steps do firms take to manage or reduce
the risks once they have been identified? And last, they would want to consider
whether regulation could be used to alter those risks, for example by elevating
them, perhaps by increasing the potential damage to firms that fail to introduce
precautionary measures desired by the state.

III. COMMON TOOLS OF DECENTRED REGULATION
What are the lessons from all of this for regulatory design? Black summarizes the
decentred regulatory strategy as follows:
The hallmarks of the regulatory strategies advocated are that they are hybrid
(combining governmental and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a
number of different strategies simultaneously or sequentially), and indirect … .
Essentially, decentred regulation involves a shift … in the locus of the activity of
“regulating” from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the adoption on the

49. Ibid at 145, 153. Power observes that “risk management” creates “an inner regulatory space”
within firms that has the potential to “enfranchise” external stakeholders by giving voice
within the organization to their concerns and interests. See also discussion in Doorey, “Who
Made That,” supra note 9.
50. See discussion in Doorey, “Who Made That,” ibid at 372-76.
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part of the state of particular strategies of regulation. ...[G]overnments should not
row and cannot steer, at least not directly. Rather they have to create the conditions
in which firms, markets, etc. steer themselves, but in the direction that governments
want them to go … .”51

The range of regulatory tools proposed to perform this steering role is varied, but
there are a number of techniques that have come to define the approach most clearly.
A. MULTIPLE REGULATORY STREAMS

One technique is the use of multiple regulatory streams. This strategy draws on
the insight that a “one model fits all” approach to regulation may underutilize
the state’s potential to influence behaviour through a mixture of risk and reward,
incentives and sanctions. In theory, if properly designed, the state can align
its policy objectives with firms’ business objectives by conditioning a more
favourable regulatory stream on compliance with the state’s desired norms. The
state’s preferred mode of behaviour is thus incentivized.52
Orly Lobel has praised this approach in relation to American experiments
in occupational health and safety regulation.53 Lobel cites the Maine 200 pilot
program developed in the 1990s, which sought to reduce high levels of workplace
accidents in that state. The Maine area office of the federal Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) had devoted substantial resources to
enforcement of the reams of rules and standards in the legislation and regulations,
and yet workplace accidents remained high. Lobel notes that prior to the adoption
of the Maine 200 program, Maine’s OSHA office “was imposing the most fines
and still had the worst injury and illness rates in the country.”54
In 1993, the 200 firms with the highest rates of lost days due to injuries
were given a choice: experience increased government inspections for compliance
under existing regulations, or participate in an alternative cooperative stream in
which the state would principally educate and guide self-regulation. Almost all of
the organizations opted for the new program. They were required to develop and
adopt a workplace safety program, aided by the OSHA. The program required
51. Black, “Decentring,” supra note 10 at 111-13.
52. This is an operational assumption in Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 8. They propose a
model that incentivizes effective self-regulatory schemes while threatening progressively
heavier sanctions for businesses that do not effectively self-regulate.
53. See “Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of Workplace Safety”
(2005) 57:4 Admin L Rev 1071; See also Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 78-82.
54. Lobel, ibid at 1117.

64

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

organizations to report problems and then work with the OSHA to address
them. According to Lobel:
Maine 200 was proclaimed as a great success, winning Ford Foundation and
government awards for innovation. Employers self-identified more than 14 times
as many hazards as could have been cited by OSHA and significantly lowered their
injuries rates. 55

In the first year of the program, worker compensation claims in Maine dropped
by 35%. The perceived success of the Maine project inspired the Clinton
Administration, which in 1995 announced a shift in occupational safety and health
enforcement “from one of command and control to one that provides employers
a real choice between a partnership and a traditional enforcement relationship.”56
Cynthia Estlund has argued that preferential regulatory rules and processes,
such as fewer inspections, should be offered to employers who adopt a process of
self-regulation of employment practices that includes some form of independent
representation by their employees.57 Anticipating the objection that employers’
dislike of unions or other forms of independent representation would dissuade
most employers from opting for the high road of self-regulation, she observes:
A crucial part of the calculus will be the nature of the default regime for non selfregulators. Tougher regulatory scrutiny and sanctions on low-road employers will
both make the high road more appealing and protect responsible self-regulators
from unfair competition.58

The state still defines what is required to qualify for the more cooperative stream,
and an organization can be thrust back into the more interventionist stream upon
failing to satisfy these requirements. However, organizations that opt for the
more cooperative stream are given guidance, support, and education by the state
and granted the opportunity to prove that they can self-regulate their conduct in
accordance with the state’s rules and objectives.59
Proponents of multiple regulatory streams identify several potential benefits.
One is that compliance is likely to be higher when it makes good business sense
55. Ibid at 1118.
56. The New OSHA: Reinventing Safety and Health (May 1996), online: United States
Department of Labor <http://www.osha.gov/doc/outreachtraining/htmlfiles/newosha.html>;
see discussion in Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 80.
57. Regoverning, supra note 7 at 148-49.
58. “A Return to Governance in the Law of the Workplace” (NYU Law School, Public Law &
Legal Theory Series No 10-39, 2010) at 11, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1640566>.
59. Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 220.
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to comply, and offering incentives for compliance as well as sanctions for noncompliance will increase the probability of more firms electing to comply. By
rewarding compliance with a less interventionist state, the model is applauded for
positively reinforcing the tendencies of many managers to behave responsibly. In
addition, the dual regulatory stream approach can encourage a more efficient use
of limited state resources by allowing the state to direct more attention at highrisk actors that show little interest in self-governing.
B. VARIABLE SANCTIONING MODELS

A related strategy involves reduced penalties for statutory infringements when
firms have taken the precautionary procedural steps the state desires. The idea
is to give firms credit, in the form of lesser penalties, if they have introduced
internal management checks and balances designed to reduce the possibility of
a violation, and yet the violation nevertheless occurs.60 Although the violation is
the same in each case, the justification for punishing the former firm to a lesser
degree is that it is less blameworthy, since it made reasonable efforts to avoid the
problem in a manner endorsed by the state.61 The expectation is that more firms
will take the precautions in order to obtain the benefit of reduced penalties, and
fewer violations will occur if more firms take these precautions.
C. EMPOWERING AND ENABLING PRIVATE ACTORS

Private actors play an important role in the decentred approach to regulation.
The state is encouraged to harness the norm-creating potential of non-state
actors to achieve public policy goals. There are numerous ways to do this. Some
examples include: certifying or importing into regulation privately developed
codes of conduct; providing government funding to private agencies and actors
who help promote the state’s values or enforce regulations; or granting special
legal privileges to organizations that perform services of value to the state.
60. Ibid at 133-35. Estlund notes that a decentred approach to regulation would consider not
only the outcomes of firm behaviour, but would also consider as relevant to the assessment of
damages steps taken within the firm to reduce the likelihood of wrongs occurring.
61. Orly Lobel explains how the United States Supreme Court has recognized defences to
workplace discrimination cases where the employer had adopted anti-discrimination or
harassment policies. The cases were: Kolstad v American Dental Association 527 US 526
(1999) and Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth 524 US 742 (1998). See Lobel, “Renew
Deal,” supra note 7 at 421. For a criticism of this approach, see Susan Bisom-Rapp, “An
Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing
Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law” (2001)
22:1 Berkeley J Emp & Lab L 1.
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The idea of empowering private actors to help achieve public goals is familiar
to labour lawyers, who have long appreciated the importance of private norm
creation in the workplace setting. For example, Michel Coutu observed recently:
[L]abour law continues to have some features of what Gunther Teubner has called
reflexive law—that is, a form of interaction between state and private ordering, in
which private parties are expected to reflect on their own conduct and to regulate it
in a way that is consistent with the social objectives of the particular area of law.62

The Wagner Act model exhibits many elements of a decentred approach to
regulation. Namely, it aims to influence conditions of employment by adjusting
the power relations in which employment contract terms are bargained by the
actors themselves.63
Private actors can be extremely knowledgeable about the forces that influence
behaviour. To use another labour and employment law example, there are a
number of private stakeholders or actors that can have intimate knowledge of the
reasons for low compliance with employment-related laws. These include workers
and employers, but also unions, employee advocacy organizations, legal clinics,
ethnic-based advocacy groups, faith-based organizations with interests in employment
practices within their communities, and even academics.64 A decentred approach
to regulation encourages governments to tap into the wealth of knowledge and
experience within these groups in their efforts to improve labour practices. 65
62. “Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and State Sovereignty” (2007) 13 CLELJ 147 at 151. Gunther
Teubner cited collective bargaining law as an example of reflexive law in his early work
developing the theory of reflexive law. See Teubner, “Modern Law,” supra note 9 at 276; See
also Jill Murray, “The Sound of One Hand Clapping? The ‘Ratcheting Labour Standards’
Proposal and International Labour Law” (2001) 14:3 Austl J Lab L 306 at 307; and Estlund,
“Ossification,” supra note 5 at 1527-29.
63. William B Gould, “The Third Way: Labor Policy Beyond the New Deal” (2000) 48:4 U Kan
L Rev 751 at 752.
64. For example, there is a large literature exploring “community unionism” and the efforts
of poverty and outreach clinics in investigating and trying to improve compliance with
employment regulation. See e.g. Cynthia J Cranford et al, “Community Unionism and
Labour Movement Renewal: Organizing for Fair Employment” in Pradeep Kumar &
Christopher Schenk, eds, Paths to Union Renewal: Canadian Experiences (Peterborough:
Broadview Press, 2006) 237; and Andy Banks, “The Power and Promise of Community
Unionism” (1991) 18 Lab Research Rev 17 at 18-20.
65. See e.g. Arthurs, Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 199. Professor Arthurs recommended
that the federal government consider “providing funding to clinics that advise or represent
workers in connection with their employment rights.” The rationale given was this: “Clearly,
if advocacy and advice-giving organizations were better funded, workers would be better
informed [about their legislative entitlements] and their rights under the statute would be
better protected.”
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D. INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION

Information disclosure regulation is another preferred tool in the decentred
regulation arsenal for reasons mentioned earlier.66 Disclosure regulation is usually
justified as market-correcting: it corrects information asymmetries that impede
the efficient clearing of markets.67 However, there is also a long history of using
information regulation to influence firm behaviour in such areas as environmental
and human rights practices.68 Disclosure can lead to better-informed actors.
It facilitates self-learning or self-referential fact-finding; a firm that does not
know it is engaging in harmful behaviour is unlikely to take steps to alter that
behaviour. It can clarify the expectations of contracting parties, which can reduce
the possibility of the more powerful contracting party taking advantage of the
weaker party.69
Disclosure regulation can also empower private actors in their engagements
with the disclosing firms. By providing information about firm behaviour to
private watchdogs, it can alter the relative balance of power between the firms and
the watchdogs and thereby alter the dynamic of the negotiations. If disclosing
information about some aspect of firm performance could potentially influence
sales or increase public appetite for more formal government oversight, then it
can encourage corporate leaders to take a more personal interest in the firm’s
performance, and perhaps to introduce more effective systems to ensure that the
firm’s performance improves relative to other similarly situated firms.

IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY
WORKPLACE REGULATION
Any proposal for workplace reform will meet resistance. There will always be
those on the political right who reject any form of employment regulation, and

66. See discussion in Doorey, “Who Made That,” supra note 9 at 374; Lobel, “New Governance,”
supra note 16 at 641-42; Paula J Dalley, “The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory
System” (2007) 34 Fla St UL Rev 1089; and Cynthia Estlund, “Just the Facts: The Case for
Workplace Transparency” (2011) 63 Stanford L Rev 351; Archon Fung, Dara O’Rourke &
Charles Sabel, Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? (Boston: Beacon Press 2001).
67. See Dalley, ibid at 1094; See also Mary Graham, Democracy By Disclosure: The Rise of
Technopopularism (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2002); Robert E Verrecchia,
“Essays on Disclosure” (2001) 32:1-3 J Acct & Econ 97.
68. Ibid; Bradley C Karkkainen, “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?” (2001) 89:2 Geo LJ 257.
69. See e.g. Arthurs, Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 81.
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people on the political left who oppose reforms that fall short of overhauling
capitalist relations, or that do not prioritize collective bargaining above all else.
Reforms that have survived the legislative process over the past forty years have
been forged in modest dimensions from the middle ground between these
positions. One test for decentred regulatory theory is whether it offers any insight
into the challenge of steering workplace law out of its slumber in ways that
could ultimately improve working conditions. This does not require consensus
across the political and ideological spectrum—an impossible feat—but sufficient
movement in the centre-left and centre-right within that spectrum to develop a
critical mass of political and public support for innovative and useful reforms.
As a preliminary exercise, it is useful to consider the political landscape
as it pertains to workplace law in Canada today. The “hegemony of industrial
pluralism” that dominated since the early 1950s has been eroding since the
1980s.70 By the turn of the century, industrial pluralism, and its preference for
collective bargaining, had fallen so far from favour that one of its leading voices,
Harry Arthurs, had pronounced its death.71 Pluralism came under attack from
the neoclassical perspective;72 neoclassicalists reject state-sponsored support
for collective bargaining on the grounds that it distorts the free operation of
labour markets, producing harmful economic outcomes.73 They argue for limited
state involvement in the regulation of the employment relationship in order to
permit “free” markets to establish equilibrium conditions of employment.74 The
ascendancy of the law and economics model associated with the neoclassical
70. Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action
in Canada, 1900-1948 (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 2001) at 302-03; Paul
Weiler, “Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA”
(1983) 96:8 Harvard L Rev 1769 at 1769; Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, From Consent to
Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, 3d ed (Toronto: Garamond Press, 2003) ch 9.
71. “Landscape and Memory: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism, and Globalization” in Ton
Wilthagen, ed, Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a Global Context
(Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1998) 21 at 25.
72. Paul C Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) at 118-24 [Weiler, Governing]; Panitch &
Swartz, supra note 70; Dan Crow & Greg Albo, “Neo-Liberalism, NAFTA, and the State of
the North American Labour Movements” (2005) 6 & 7 Just Lab 12.
73. See e.g. Richard A Posner, “Some Economics of Labor Law” (1984) 51:4 U Chicago L Rev
988; Richard A Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1995) at 162-63; Richard A Epstein, “A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique
of the New Deal Labor Legislation” (1983) 92:8 Yale LJ 1357; Milton Friedman, Capitalism
and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) at 12-15; Weiler, Governing, ibid
at 122-24.
74. Ibid.
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perspective from the 1980s is an important part of the story of the stagnation of
labour law in both countries over the past quarter century.
But it is only part of the story. The prescriptions of the neoclassical school
have not been adopted, except at the margins. Work remains among the most
regulated of relationships and collective bargaining remains embedded in
labour statutes. The ascendancy of the neoclassical perspective manifests itself in
more subtle ways, such as a reduced emphasis on enforcement of employment
regulation, budget cuts to labour ministries, and an unwillingness to modernize
existing legislation to make it more effective as the nature of work has evolved. A
full frontal attack on government intervention in the employment relationship of
the sort called for by neoclassicalists would have no political legs.
The dominant perspective on workplace law today is neither neoclassical
nor pluralist. Industrial pluralism has given way to a perspective approximating
what the industrial relations literature describes as the unitarist or managerialist
perspective.75 The managerialist perspective is closely aligned with contemporary
Human Resources Management (HRM). It describes collective bargaining
in mostly negative terms, as rigid, confrontational, and costly for employers.
These attributes are said to be particularly harmful in the hyper-competitive
era of economic globalization, when managerial flexibility is crucial. In this
climate, high levels of trust are required between employee and employer so that
employers can tap into employee knowledge.76 The managerialist believes that
employers can design human resource systems that foster trust by creating work
environments in which employees are treated with decency, fairness, and respect,
and that it is preferable to do this without collective bargaining.
The defining feature of the managerialist position on labour and employment
law is the belief that, ideally, neither is necessary. Employers have an economic
interest in treating workers fairly, since engaged, satisfied workers are more
productive workers who are also more likely to buy into the organization’s
goals and to share useful information.77 Regulation can be useful insofar as it
75. See e.g. John Godard, Industrial Relations, the Economy, and Society, 3d ed (Concord: Captus
Press, 2005) at 12-15; John W Budd & Devasheesh Bhave, “The Employment Relationship”
in Adrian Wilkinson et al, eds, The SAGE Handbook of Human Resource Management
(London, UK: SAGE, 2010) 51.
76. Hugh Collins, “Is There a Third Way in Labour Law?” in Anthony Giddens, ed, The Global
Third Way Debate (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001) 300 at 306 [Collins, “Labour Law”].
77. This idea can be traced to the early work of Elton Mayo, in which he argued that industrial
democracy movements in Britain and the United States would enthrone “‘collective
mediocrity’ within the industry,” (at 56) while also arguing that business methods that
“take no account of human nature and social motives” would lead to “strikes and sabotage”
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encourages employers to adopt progressive HRM policies and supports their
efforts to do so. However, the fact that the state perceives a need for employment
regulation and supportive collective bargaining legislation is perceived as a failure
of management, as John W. Budd and Devasheesh Bhave describe:
Labor unions and government-mandated labor standards are viewed as unnecessary
in the [managerialist] employment relationship. When employers successfully align
their interests with their employees’ interests through effective human resource
management practices, employees will be satisfied and will not support a labor union
or need-mandated employment standards. The presence of a union or employment
law is taken as a signal of failed human resource management practices. Unions are
further seen as outside third parties that add conflict to what should be a conflictfree employment relationship.78

The view that unionization is a response to poor management and weak HRM
practices is widely held among contemporary North American managers. It is
espoused regularly in management and HRM literature79 and captured in popular
HRM slogans, such as “you get the union you deserve.”
Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers found that about one-third of American
managers believed that a decision by workers under their supervision to unionize
would reflect poorly on their managerial skills and harm their careers.80 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the HRM profession encourages managers to develop
employment practices that will remove the incentive for employees to unionize.
as an ordinary aspect of commerce (at 53). See Democracy and Freedom: An Essay in Social
Logic (Melbourne: Macmillan & Co, 1919). His later work, including his studies in the
famous Hawthorne experiments, set the foundation for the human relations and later
human resource management schools. See The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933); see also Paul Edwards, “The Employment
Relationship and the Field of Industrial Relations” in Paul Edwards, ed, Industrial Relations:
Theory and Practice, 2d ed (Malden: Blackwell, 2003) 1 at 10-11; Alan Fox, Industrial
Sociology and Industrial Relations (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1966) at 5-6.
78. Supra note 75 at 64.
79. A common theme in human resources literature and scholarship is that employers can avoid
unionization by removing employee demand for unionization through human resource
policies. This strategy is often labeled “union substitution” or “union avoidance” in the
Human Resources Management (HRM) and industrial relations literature. See Jon Peirce
& Karen Joy Bentham, Canadian Industrial Relations, 3d ed (Toronto: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2007) at 41. For example, one leading Canadian human resources textbook advises
that “[t]he best work environment, and the least receptive to unionization, is one that
treats the individual with respect, dignity, and fairness, while encouraging participation in
decision making.” See Monica Belcourt, George Bohlander & Scott Snell, Managing Human
Resources, 6th ed (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2010) at 556.
80. See What Workers Want (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) at 116.
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For example, a leading professional HRM association in Canada holds regular
seminars designed to teach managers what policies will achieve this result. A
recent seminar flyer included the following instructive:
If you are union-free, you should try to stay that way. This is not a matter of magic,
legal trickery or blind luck. It takes consistent and effective management practiced dayin and day-out, based on a long-term plan. The union only has to succeed once. To
remain union-free, management has to succeed every single day, forever and always.81

HRM instructs managers to avoid unions by “offering employees many services
provided by union workplaces.”82 In other words, the unionized workplace is
a source of information in the managerialist perspective about decent and fair
employment practices.
The perspective that workers join unions primarily as a response to perceived
unfair treatment at the hands of their employer finds support in surveys of
workers too. For example, the Freeman and Rogers survey measured the demand
for unionization by non-union American workers, and found the following:
•

•

•

•

90% of employees want a union when relations between employees
and employers are either Poor (50%) or Fair (40%), whereas only
20% of employees want a union when employee-employer relations
are excellent.
57% of employees want a union when they perceive management
to be untrustworthy, whereas only 20% want a union when they
have a lot of trust in management.
71% of employees want a union when management shows little
concern for employees, whereas only 27% want a union when
management shows a high level of concern for employees.
69% of employees want a union when their perceive management
is unwilling to share power with employees, whereas only 18%
want a union when they perceive management’s willingness to share
power is excellent.83

81. Human Resources Professionals Association, Protecting Your Organization from Unionization:
How to keep your workplace union-free (10 November 2010), online: Canadian HR Reporter
<http://www.hrreporter.com/DynamicData/AttachedImages/Webinar/html/BrowserProtectingYourOrgNov10-2010.html>.
82. Anil Verma, “What Do Unions Do to the Workplace? Union Effects on Management and
HRM Policies” (2005) 26:3 J Lab Research 415 at 443 (and studies cited therein).
83. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 80 at 110.
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These results support the managerialist claim that progressive HRM strategies
lessen the demand for union representation. They also demonstrate that there
is a high level of demand for unionization among employees of employers who
do not adopt such policies and who treat their employees unfairly. In short,
employees of “low road” employers have a high demand for unionization, as the
managerialist perspective predicts.
The position that unions are principally a response to bad management has
obvious political attractions. The neoclassical position that collective bargaining
and employment regulation are always bad is too polarizing or extreme for many
politicians and voters. The notion that unions serve a useful purpose by providing
employees of bad, low road employers with “voice” as an alternative to “exit”84
allows such politicians and voters to straddle a middle political ground. They are
not against unions and collective bargaining per se, but nor do they believe the
state should aggressively promote wide-scale unionization. Rather, they argue
that the state’s role should be to encourage employers to treat their employees
responsibly—to be high road employers—since this will improve productivity
and employee (voter) contentment and contribute to the goal of a reasonable
distribution of wealth while still giving workers access to collective bargaining
when their employers mistreat them. Supporting unionization of low road
employers demonstrates empathy with working people, while not privileging
collective bargaining over the non-union, individual bargaining model.
This outlook leads managerialists to co-opt the language of employee
choice and workplace democracy in order to emphasize their view that opting
for unionization is an unusual decision. The managerialist assumes that most
employers are “good” (that is, respectful, fair, and law-abiding) and that
employees of a good employer will not unionize unless they are somehow
misled or confused about the decision they are making. Thus, laws are needed
to encourage and facilitate employer communications about unionization, and
to ensure that employees have a right to a secret ballot vote on unionization
and de-unionization (or decertification). If these conditions are satisfied, and a
majority of employees still select unionization, then the managerialist presumes
that workers were treated so unfairly that they felt unionization was their best
option short of quitting. In that case, the managerialist believes that the state is
justified in imposing collective bargaining and a duty to bargain on the employer.

84. Albert O Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,
and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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FIGURE 1: PERSPECTIVES ON THE BENEFITS OF UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING (CB)

Zone of Agreement

Pluralist
Managerialist
Neoclassicalist

C.B. Harmful;
State Should
Discourage

C.B. is a Rational
Response to Low
Road Employers

C.B. Beneficial;
State Should
Encourage

This brief recounting of the managerialist perspective was intended to
demonstrate a potential overlap with the pluralist perspective. Although there
is profound disagreement about the overall utility of unions and collective
bargaining, there is agreement that collective bargaining is a rational mechanism
to deal with low road employers. Both perspectives agree that unionization may
actually improve the situation at low road employers—certainly for employees,
but perhaps also for the business. Industrial relations research demonstrates that
unionization can shock employers into adopting more effective management
techniques as well as introducing more employee training and better systems of
communication with employees.85
A basis for an uneasy political alliance between supporters of the managerialist
and pluralist perspectives emerges, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Dominant
perspectives on the appropriate role of unions and collective bargaining today
range along a continuum. For our purposes, we can place the neoclassical
perspective at one end and the pluralist at the other. Neoclassicalists reject any
useful role for unions and collective bargaining and argue that the invisible hand of
the market will deal with truly bad employers who mistreat employees. Pluralists,
on the other hand, believe that unions and collective bargaining are necessary to
counter the inherent imbalance of power in the employment relationship and to
provide employees with a real voice in the workplace, and as such have intrinsic value.
85. Anil Verma summarizes the extensive literature looking at the impact of unionizaiton. See
Verma, supra note 82.
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The managerialist perspective falls between these positions. It is sympathetic
to the neoclassical position that collective bargaining is unnecessary and
potentially disruptive to the economic goals of productivity, flexibility, and
profitability. However, managerialists place their trust in enlightened employers,
not in theoretical economic models to ensure workplaces that are productive and
efficient, but also equitable to workers. Thus, as Figure 1 demonstrates, there is a
potential zone of agreement between the managerialist and pluralist perspectives
when it comes to dealing with recalcitrant, low road employers who treat their
employees poorly.
The political majority no longer accepts the pluralist claim that workers need
collective bargaining. Neither does the majority accept the claims of neoclassicalists
that the state should get out of the business of regulating employment contracts
and abolish unions and collective bargaining. Instead, the prevailing view lies
in the shared space that accepts a legitimate role for collective bargaining but
a considerably more limited one than was the dominant view for most of the
post-war period.86
The managerialist perspective that I have just described as politically dominant
is nevertheless highly controversial. It is attacked from both the political left and
right. If one believes that collective labour rights are fundamental human rights,
for example, then the claim that employees do not need union representation so
long as their employer maintains ‘progressive’ HRM policies is highly offensive.87
Critical scholars and pluralists find preposterous the claim that a combination
of markets and unilateral management practices can protect workers’ interests.88
86. This dynamic is evident in political discourse surrounding recent labour law reform
initiatives, such as the 12 August 1992 exchange between an Ontario Conservative Party
opposition member (Elizabeth Witmer) and a Director of the United Steelworkers of
America (Henry Hynd) during labour law reform consultations in the early 1990s. See
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development, “Bill 40,
Labour Relations and Employment Statute Amendment Act, 1992” (12 August 1992),
online: <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.
do?locale=en&Date=1992-08-12&ParlCommID=499&BillID=&Business=Bill+40%2C+
Labour+Relations+and+Employment+Statute+Law+Amendment+Act%2C+1992&Docum
entID=17907>. Both speakers—a conservative politician and a labour leader—agreed that
employees would be unlikely to want a union if their employer treats them decently, and that
employees would be more likely to opt for unionization if their employer treats them unfairly.
87. See e.g. James A Gross, ed, Workers’ Rights as Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2003); Roy J Adams, Labour Left Out: Canada’s Failure to Protect and Promote Collective
Bargaining as a Human Right (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2006).
88. See e.g. Eric Tucker, “Industry and Humanity Revisited: Everything Old is New Again,”
Book Review of Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law by Paul C
Weiler (1991) 36:4 McGill LJ 1481; Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 218, 235-36.
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Pluralists and neoclassicalists alike reject the claim that the principal role for
unions and collective bargaining should be to deal with ‘bad’ employers, but for
very different reasons. Pluralists perceive inherent value in collective bargaining
for all employees (and employers as well),89 whereas the neoclassicalists argue that
market forces alone will discipline ‘bad’ employers.90
My point is not that the managerialist perspective is correct. The managerialist
position that collective bargaining is unnecessary but nevertheless a rational
response by employees to poor HR practices has become politically dominant
only because it carves out enough common space from the various perspectives
to erect an uneasy political middle ground. Centrists with a neoclassicalist bent
can tolerate the limited role for unions in the managerialist perspective since
it accepts that the non-union model is preferable. For centrists who lean more
towards the pluralist approach, the managerialist perspective at least affirms a
legitimate role for collective bargaining and unions.
The ascendancy of the managerialist perspective shapes the range of viable
legislative reforms in workplace law, just as the Pluralist perspective guided the
development of the Wagner Act model in the post-war era.91 Reforms most likely
to gain traction are those that can be molded to fit within the worldview of the
managerialist perspective. Managerialists are ambivalent towards employment
standards laws.92 A reasonable set of base norms set down in regulation can
act as a signal to employers identifying the minimum expected level of decent
employment practices within a jurisdiction. Managerialists will argue against
standards perceived to be too high or too inflexible to be useful as a base
default, but they also expect employers to comply with those standards that
the government has fixed. Obeying employment laws is part and parcel of the
techniques a responsible employer deploys in order to attract the loyalty, trust,
and commitment from employees that is necessary to exact maximum output.
As discussed above, while managerialists reject calls for aggressive state
intervention to promote wide-scale collective bargaining, they are more
sympathetic to the argument that the state should ensure that mistreated workers
have access to collective bargaining. If they do not, and employment standards
regulation continues to be poorly implemented, then these workers will either
89. Weiler, ibid; Guy Davidov, “The (Changing?) Idea of Labour Law” (2007) 146:3-4 Int’l Lab
Rev 311.
90. Armen A Alchian & William R Allen, University Economics, 3d ed (Belmont: Wadsworth,
1972) at 407; Milton Friedman & Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980) at 218, 235-36.
91. Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 121.
92. Godard, supra note 75 at 15.

76

(2012) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

quit or be left to toil under poor and abusive working conditions. Neither
outcome is acceptable to the managerialist because both produce inefficient
workplaces staffed by unmotivated and disloyal workers. This is the antithesis
of what the managerialist perceives to be necessary for the modern high
performance workplace.

V. A DECENTRED PROPOSAL FOR WORKPLACE LAW
REFORM
It is possible to design a workplace law reform package that draws on the lessons
of decentred regulation and that is consistent with the dominant managerialist
perspective. The principal objectives would be twofold:
1. To encourage employers to adopt high road HRM practices
(including, at least, compliance with the government’s minimum
employment standards); and
2. To ensure that non-union workers whose employers fail to adopt
those high road HRM practices have access to collective bargaining
to protect their interests.
Our existing laws are inadequate on both accounts. First, as noted previously,
there are persistent high levels of non-compliance with even minimum
employment standards regulation.93 This demonstrates that many employers are
either ignorant of their statutory obligations or unmotivated to comply with
them and that the existing legal model is failing to remedy this problem.
Second, the existing union certification model is heavily stacked against
employees who desire collective bargaining, particularly when their employer is
prepared to wage a heavy campaign against unionization. Even the worst low
road employers, those that persistently violate employment laws for example, are
still permitted to wage a pitched battle against their employees’ efforts to secure
collective bargaining. They have at their disposal every legal right to resist such
efforts that is available to the best of the high road, law-abiding employers. From
a decentred perspective, this represents a significant wasted opportunity to steer
employers towards greater attentiveness to employment standards. Employers
who can ignore basic employment standards laws and still effectively impede
their workers from unionizing also pose a problem for the managerialist. Workers
of those low road employers have no viable voice mechanism94 to improve
93. Supra note 2.
94. Supra note 84.
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their working conditions: They will either quit, causing high turnover, or toil
under poor conditions—neither of which will produce the efficient workplaces
managerialists desire.
One decentred response to this problem becomes immediately evident:
create two regulatory streams, one for law-abiding employers who obey the
state’s employment standards (the low-risk stream), and another for employers
who demonstrate a lack of capacity or willingness to comply with the state’s
basic employment laws (the high-risk stream). This model would require a clear
statement of what rules need to be complied with in order to qualify for the
more favourable low-risk stream. Should breach of any work-related statute put
an employer in the high-risk stream? Or, would the state wish to place special
emphasis only on the breach of some special subset of rules?
One option that would be consistent with the decentred approach would be
to allow private actors themselves to develop a code that defines the bundle of rules
that must be complied with in order to remain in the low-risk stream, perhaps
working within parameters set down by the state. For example, a coalition of
employers could engage in discussions with the major union organization (such
as the provincial labour federation) and representatives of organizations that
represent non-union workers. The code of conduct that emerges could then form
the basis for the law’s distinctive treatment of high and low-risk employers.95 If
the actors cannot agree on a model code, the state would implement its own,
creating an incentive for employers to negotiate a voluntary agreement.
This is not as farfetched as it might at first sound. Recent Australian
legislation instructed key players in the textile and clothing industries, including
producers, retailers, and the textile union, to negotiate a code of practice for
the employment of home workers. Failing voluntary agreement, the legislation
provided that the state would impose its own mandatory code that would govern
employment practices in the industries.96 When the legislation was introduced,
the government representative explained this aspect of the legislation as follows:
95. The New York City Greengrocer Code of Conduct operates in this way: In exchange for
a conditional amnesty on some past employment standards violations, grocery employers
were encouraged to bargain a code of conduct for employment practices with union and
NGO representatives that would serve as the basis for ongoing government inspections. See
Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 112.
96. See discussions in Michael Rawling, “A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain
Outsourcing” in Christopher Arup et al, eds, Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation
(Annandale: Federation Press, 2006) 520; Shelley Marshall, “Australian Textile Clothing and
Footwear Supply Chain Regulation” in Colin Fenwick & Tonia Novitz, eds, Human Rights at
Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 2010) 555.
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The introduction of a mandatory code of practice for the clothing industry is
provided for in the bill. However, it is not the Government’s preferred option. A
mandatory code will only proceed if the self-regulatory mechanisms fail to deliver
lawful entitlements to outworkers or the industry participants are not attempting in
good faith to negotiate improvements or extensions to those mechanisms.97

A voluntary code was agreed upon, which the state then incorporated into
law, making it mandatory. A benefit of this approach is that it would include
employer buy-in. Presumably, the standards that emerged would be ones that
industry itself accepts as reasonable and attainable.
However, we can keep our model simple for the purpose of this general
discussion. Even if the state were to contract out the development of a code of
conduct, what emerged would certainly include a requirement to comply at least
with some of the most obvious and important existing employment-related rules.
It could include more than this, but it would surely include at least this much.
So we can begin with that. The state could select a bundle of core laws that it
wishes to emphasize and identify those laws as the “Base Code of Responsible
Employment Practices” (“Code”), similar to the American government’s “effective
compliance program” used to define which companies are granted preferential
sentencing, mentioned earlier in Part II.98 This Code might include, for example,
the following important rules governing employment practices:
•
•
•
•
•

Minimum wage
Overtime pay rules
Hours of work restrictions
Termination and severance pay requirements
Unfair labour practices governing union organizing campaigns

The latter refers to legislative restrictions found in labour relations statutes that
prohibit employers from interfering with employees’ decisions about whether
to unionize through threats, intimidation, promises, or coercion (including
dismissals or punishment of union supporters).99
While violating laws not included in the Code will still attract the usual array
of sanctions (fines, back pay orders, et cetera), an employer that violates one of
the laws included in the Code would, in addition to the normal remedies, forfeit
97. See New South Wales, Legislative Council, Hansard (11 December 2001) at 1959 (Hon John
Della Bosca), online: <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/PARLMENT/hansArt.nsf/
V3Key/LC20011211037>.
98. See discussion in Parker, supra note 41.
99. See, for example, the Labour Relations Act, SO 1995, c 1, ss 70, 72, 76 [OLRA] (which sets
out the relevant restrictions in Ontario).
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a bundle of additional legal rights and benefits available only to employers who
have earned their place in the low-risk stream by demonstrating responsible, lawabiding behaviour. This alone is a very different way of thinking about workplace
law than what we are used to in Canada. It blurs the distinction between the
employment standards and labour relations regimes in a way we are not used
to. But it is consistent with the decentred approach to regulation: It uses sticks
and carrots to steer behaviour, and it deploys the risk of forfeiting valued rights
to resist collective bargaining with the expectation that employers averse to
collective bargaining will find greater value in learning and complying with the
Code and will accordingly adjust their internal management systems to promote
legal compliance. It also harnesses the knowledge and power of private actors,
including unions and other actors interested in protecting workers’ interests in
ways I will explain below.
Having explored how the law might differentiate between high- and low-risk
employers, we can now flesh out how the two regulatory streams might vary.
What would law-abiding, low-risk employers receive to encourage continued legal
compliance? What rights would law-breaking, high-risk employers forfeit under
this model? The distinction needs to be sufficiently stark to create an incentive
to comply with the Code, while also facilitating access to collective bargaining
for employees of high-risk employers. Some familiar possibilities come to mind.
For example, high-risk employers could be disqualified from receiving various
government benefits, such as procurement possibilities in government tenders,
government business licenses needed to conduct various types of activities, and tax
incentives.100 Government inspections of employment law compliance could be
more frequent for high-risk employers on the theory that they pose a greater risk
of non-compliance.101 This would assist governments in targeting scarce resources
at high-risk areas. Transparency could be useful here too; the state could publish a
“sunshine list” of employers who violate the Code as a form of public shaming, which
could motivate some employers who are sensitive to negative publicity.102
100. Interestingly, the Ontario Minister of Labour recently contacted the Mayor of
Nashville to request that an employer that had violated Ontario’s Employment
Standards Act not be awarded a lucrative telecommunications contract from the
Nashville government. See “Oshawa Closure: A matter of worker rights”, The
Toronto Star (20 July 2011), online: <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/
article/1028006--oshawa-closure-a-matter-of-worker-rights>.
101. See Estlund, Regoverning, supra note 7 at 219-21.
102. The Ontario government is already moving in this direction. See Employment Standards Act,
SO 2000, c 41, s 138.1. This recently enacted provision empowers the Ministry of Labour
to publish the names and offences of persons and companies that have committed offences
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However, an even more novel and powerful set of incentives can be built into
our dual regulatory track model that would help achieve both key objectives cited
above: encouraging compliance with the Code, and ensuring that employees of
high-risk employers are able to secure access to collective bargaining despite
predictably hostile resistance from their law-breaking employers. The law could
create a distinction in the bundle of rights available to employers to participate
in the union organizing process. As noted earlier, employers are presently granted
a considerable arsenal of legal rights to resist their employees’ attempts to gain
access to collective bargaining. These rights could be treated as earned rights
available only to responsible, law-abiding employers, rather than unconditional
entitlements as the law currently treats them.
The rights I am referring to include: speech rights to campaign against
unionization; property rights to exclude union organizers from non-working
areas of employer property; and the right to insist on a certification ballot in
the face of documentary union membership evidence representing a majority
of bargaining unit employees. All of these rights to resist unionization have
been restricted in Canada (and abroad) at one time or another, so nothing in
this proposal is revolutionary. However, making these rights contingent upon a
demonstration of responsible employment practices does require a new way of
thinking. There is much to commend the idea.
Consider more closely the rights our existing laws confer on employers
to resist their employees’ efforts to secure access to collective bargaining. First,
common law and trespass to property legislation grant employers the right to
exclude union organizers from any place on employer property.103 Second, in
most Canadian jurisdictions employers have broad rights to proselytize against
collective bargaining through “captive audience meetings” in which employees are
ordered to stop work and listen to the employer’s message through one-on-one
discussions, by email, in literature, on bulletin boards, and even at an employee’s
home.104 Laws impose restrictions on the content of the speech—there cannot be
threats, intimidation, or promises of rewards for rejecting unionization. However,
under the Act. Each month the government publishes a list of offenders, including their
offence and fine.
103. See Patrick Macklem, “Property, Status, and Workplace Organizing” (1990) 40 UTLJ 74;
Dianne Avery, “Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: The NLRB and the
Right to Exclude” (1989) 11:2 Indus Rel LJ 145.
104. The federal Labour Board restricts employer speech to a much greater extent than its
provincial counterparts, generally denying a right of employer anti-union speech. See Union
Bank of Employees (Ontario), Local 2104 v Bank of Montreal (1985), 10 CLRBR (NS) 129
(WL) [Bank of Montreal].
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the law’s preference for employer communicative access to workers during the
union organizing campaign has long been noted as a peculiarity of the Wagner
Act model.105
Contrast this model with the British approach to governing certification
elections. The British statutory certification system assumes that a purpose of
a legal model governing a unionization election should be to promote parity of
access to employees to produce a relatively balanced presentation of the issues.106
The law requires that unions be given access to the workplace during working
hours to address the workers to an amount roughly equal to the time spent by the
employer communicating with workers. It also facilitates union communication with
employees outside of work. The employer must provide the government with the
employees’ home addresses so that the state can mail union literature to the employees.
Canadian laws confer no such rights on unions during organizing campaigns.
Third, employers in most (though not all) Canadian jurisdictions may now
insist upon a certification ballot (mandatory ballot) conducted by the state, even
when a clear majority of workers have already signed union membership cards
indicating their support for collective bargaining.107 Until the 1990s, the more
common model in Canada required only that unions demonstrate majority
support in the form of documentary evidence (card-check model). Empirical
evidence demonstrates that workers have a much more difficult time getting
access to collective bargaining when the process requires unions to collect
union membership cards and then also win a subsequent ballot.108 Scholars
attribute this result in large measure to the anti-union campaigns (both lawful

105. Macklem, supra note 103; Julius G Getman, Stephen B Goldberg & Jeanne B Herman,
Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976)
at 97, 157; Karl E Klare, “Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform” (1988) 38:1 Cath U L Rev 1; and David J Doorey, “Union Access to Workers
during Organizing Campaigns: A New Look Through the Lens of BC Health Services” (20092010) 15:1 CLELJ 1 [Doorey, “Union Access”].
106. Alan L Bogg, “The Political Theory of Trade Union Recognition Campaigns: Legislating
For Democratic Competitiveness” (2001) 64 Mod L Rev 875 at 886; Ruth Dukes, “The
Statutory Recognition Procedure 1999: No Bias in Favour of Recognition?” (2008) 37 Ind
LJ 236 at 248.
107. The Federal jurisdiction, along with Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and
Quebec still permit unions to be certified without a ballot upon demonstrating majority
support in the form of documentary evidence.
108. See Chris Riddell, “Union Certification Success under Voting Versus Card-Check
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1998” (2004) 57 Indus & Lab Rel Rev
493; Susan Johnson, “Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote? How the Type of
Union Recognition Procedure Affects Union Certification Success” (2002) 112:479 Econ J 344.
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and unlawful) waged by employers in the days preceding the ballot.109 In a
card-check system, the opportunity for employers to campaign against collective
bargaining is more limited.
When North American unions and employers bargain private contracts
governing union campaigns, often referred to as “neutrality agreements,” they
focus on these legal rights the North American model confers on employers to
resist their employees’ efforts to unionize. Neutrality agreements emerged in the
United States in the 1980s and subsequently crossed the border into Canada.110
They are designed to facilitate a less combative process than that envisioned by
the public legal model. The most common terms in these agreements include a
requirement for the employer to remain ‘neutral’ and to refrain from arguing
against unionization, union access to the workplace and to information enabling
it to contact workers outside of the workplace, and a card-check certification
process that permits a union to prove majority support by submitting union
membership cards alone, rather than also winning a vote.111 All of these were
components of the recently negotiated Framework of Fairness neutrality
agreement between Magna International, Inc. and the Canadian Auto Workers,
for example.112
Recall that one of the lessons of the decentred approach is that governments
should observe and learn from private norm-making processes. If we want to
know how the law could better facilitate unionization of law-breaking, high-risk
employers, we need look no further than what unions have bargained themselves
in neutrality agreements.
To summarize, therefore, the rights that responsible, law-abiding
employers should earn in the low-risk stream, and conversely, the legal rights
law-breaking, irresponsible employers should forfeit in the high-risk stream
would include the following:
109. Ibid; See also Weiler, Governing, supra note 72 at 13-15; Karen J Bentham, “Employer
Resistance to Union Certification: A Study of Eight Canadian Jurisdictions” (2002) 57:1 RI
159.
110. See discussion in David J Doorey, “Neutrality Agreements: Bargaining for Representation
Rights in the Shadow of the State” (2006-2007) 13 CLELJ 41; James J Brudney, “Neutrality
Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms” (2005)
90:3 Iowa L Rev 819. The best known Canadian neutrality agreement involved the 2007
Canadian Auto Workers-Magna International Framework of Fairness. See analysis in Martin
H Malin, “The Canadian Auto Workers-Magna International, Inc Framework of Fairness
Agreement: A US Perspective” (2010) 54:2 Saint Louis ULJ 525.
111. Adrienne E Eaton & Jill Kriesky, “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check
Agreements” (2001) 55:1 Indus & Lab Rel Rev 42.
112. See Malin, supra note 110.
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The right of employer speech intended to dissuade workers from supporting
collective bargaining and unions. High-risk employers would be
prohibited from proselytizing against unionization.
The right to exclude union organizers from non-working areas of the
workplace. High-risk employers would be required to grant some
level of access to union organizers to address workers in non-working
areas, and/or a means of communicating with the workers outside of the
workplace (as already occurs in both the United States and Britain113).
The right to insist on a secret ballot, even when the union has submitted
documentary evidence of majority support. In other words, a cardcheck system of certification would replace a mandatory ballot
model for high-risk employers.

In practice, since these rights already exist as embedded entitlements in many
Canadian jurisdictions, the new model would presumably operate as a forfeiture
system: Once an employer was found in violation of the Code by an appropriate
adjudicating body, it would forfeit the special rights that low-risk employers have
earned. For an even stronger model, the state could go further and make access to
first contract arbitration easier in the case of employees governed by the high-risk
stream on the theory that an employer that violates employment laws is also at
high-risk of trying to avoid a first collective agreement.114
The proposal to remove rights to resist unionization and to enable unions
to be certified by means of membership evidence would no doubt be met with
strong opposition by many employers and opponents of collective bargaining. We
are already familiar with the arguments against restricting employer participation
in organizing campaigns. Paul C. Weiler described them succinctly more than
twenty years ago:
[The] argument for designing a representation procedure that invites extensive
employer participation rests not on a principle of fairness to employers as such, but

113. In the United States, unions are entitled to receive the home addresses and email addresses
of bargaining unit employees prior to a state-conducted ballot. See supra note 104 for
discussions of the British model.
114. See OLRA, supra note 99, s 43(2). Existing Canadian labour legislation already conditions
access to first contract arbitration on the employer’s behaviour. For example, in determining
whether to order first contract arbitration in Ontario, the Labour Board can consider the
employer’s refusal to recognize the authority of the union, the employer’s uncompromising
bargaining position, or “any other reason the Board considers relevant.” A simple amendment
could make explicit that a previous violation of employment-related legislation would be a
factor the Board should consider in deciding whether to order arbitration.
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rather on the practical judgment that only the employer and its management can
defend the statutory rights of the antiunion employees.115

The argument is that there is a need for employers to make the case to employees
for why they are better off dealing directly with their employer, without
professional union representation and collective bargaining, since unions
certainly will not make that case. Employers are cast in the role of protector
of workers, who otherwise are prone to being misled by union organizers. The
same basic premise underlies the argument for mandatory ballots; without a vote,
employees may be duped or pressured into signing a union membership card
without full knowledge of the implications. A vote ensures that the employer
will have a chance to present the argument against collective bargaining and
guarantees that the employees are completely free of any undue influence when
they cast their ballots.
However, as Weiler and many others since have noted, if employers never
engaged in threats or intimidation designed to influence votes, those arguments
might be persuasive. But in the real world, too many employers cannot resist the
temptation to suggest to their employees that bad things might happen if they
vote in favour of collective bargaining. Weiler explained:
[A]ll other things being equal, a more informed employee choice would be a freer
one, [but] the problem is that when we extend an opportunity to the law-abiding
employer to illuminate the issues for its employees, we inevitably create both the
opportunity and the incentive for the law-violating employer to intimidate its
workers in their decision…116

The decentred model discussed in this section strikes at this fundamental
dilemma inherent in the majoritarian system established by the Wagner Act
model. It distinguishes law-abiding from law-violating employers by placing the
latter under stricter state control in order to protect the right of workers to freely
access collective bargaining.
There is also a moral justification for the dual regulatory model. An employer
that lacks the decency to comply with the state’s base Code of decent employment
practices demonstrates a high level of disrespect for its employees’ interests and
a lack of respect for legal authority. The argument that the employer’s voice is
needed during an organizing campaign in order to inform employees of the
supposed benefits of dealing with the employer directly, rather than as a collective,
rings particularly hollow when applied to a law-breaking employer. Employers
115. Governing, supra note 72 at 260-61.
116. Ibid at 261 [emphasis added].
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who violate the Code have demonstrated their unfitness to play the role of
employee protectorate, and they should get out of the way so that employees
can decide for themselves if the non-union model is serving them adequately.
The concern about unions stating mistruths to employees in order to trick or
pressure them into signing union cards could be dealt with by the creation of
a dedicated neutral government labour relations officer with responsibility to
answer employee queries directly.

VI. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS
I have been discussing an application of decentred regulation at a rather general
level. Naturally, there are details that would need to be worked out to fill in
the model that are beyond the space limitations of this paper. For example,
lawmakers would need to determine the rules governing union access and the
card-check model for the employers who have violated Code rules. This should
not be difficult, given that there are existing precedents for both. They would
need to determine the penalty for employers who exercise rights that they have
not earned. For example, what if an employer who by breaching the Code has
forfeited the right to argue against collective bargaining nevertheless does so in
a captive audience meeting? Perhaps remedial certification would be appropriate
in these cases to send a strong message to employers and serve as a deterrent.117
The state would also need to decide whether the forfeiture of the legal
rights is permanent or temporary. It would probably make sense to allow an
employer in the high-risk stream to re-qualify for the low-risk stream after a
specified violation-free period and following an inspection by the state. Would a
single violation of the state’s Base Code of Responsible Employment Practices lead to
forfeiture of legal rights, or should the two-track model be progressive? Perhaps a
single violation could cause the employer to lose some legal rights (like employer
speech rights) as a sort of shot across the bow and signal to the employer to get help
learning how to comply, but a second violation could lead to a total forfeiture.
These are details that could be worked out without too much difficulty. At
a more general level, the model discussed in Part V has several benefits. First, it
has the potential to attract broader support than proposals that more aggressively
promote collective bargaining, such as the proposal for across the board cardcheck certification and first contract arbitration found in the failed American
117. See e.g. OLRA, supra note 99, s 11. The certification remedy is usually applied only when,
due to unlawful employer conduct, it is no longer possible to test the employees’ wishes
through other means such as card-check or ballot.
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Employee Free Choice Act.118 The fact that the dual regulatory stream model
draws its inspiration and learns from privately negotiated agreements between
unions and employers may allow it to attract support from the labour movement,
particularly union organizing departments, and therefore from politicians aligned
with the labour movement.
However, unlike many other reform proposals that envision a positive
role for unions and collective bargaining, this one has the potential to attract
support beyond the labour movement and industrial pluralists. Neoclassicalists
who perceive no value in employment standards laws or collective bargaining
will never be persuaded. But the model discussed above could find support
among managerialists, or at least attract a less hostile response than most other
reforms advanced by industrial pluralists. The model incorporates into law the
managerialist prediction that employers who treat their employees with respect
and decency will face little demand for unionization, but that employers who fail
to do so should anticipate an organizing campaign. The model targets only those
employers who reject the HRM philosophy that legal compliance and high levels
of respect towards employees are necessary to produce efficient workplaces. As a
result, politicians and others who argue against the dual regulatory stream would
be cast in the role of defending the rights of employers who lack the capacity or
decency to comply with even the most basic of minimum employment standards
laws. They may not cherish that position. In addition, although unions rank
low in recent public opinion polls, the public may be more sympathetic to the
argument that unions are helpful in protecting workers from ‘bad’ employers.
Second, the model, although novel in its orientation, is actually quite modest.
As noted, the legal rights that law-breaking employers would forfeit are common
in private neutrality agreements already being bargained by employers and unions,
and none of the restrictions are legislatively novel. Canadian governments have
at various times required employers to remain neutral during union organizing
campaigns.119 There are plenty of precedents in Canadian, British, and American
118. William B Gould, IV, “The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and
What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the
United States” (2008) 43:2 USF L Rev 291.
119. For example, in the federal sector, an employer that attempts to persuade employees to reject
collective bargaining is unlawfully “interfering in the formation of a union.” See e.g. American
Airlines Inc (Toronto) v BRAC, [1981] 3 CLRBR 90, 90 CLS 6-3095; Bank of Montreal, supra
note 102. Complete neutrality has also been the rule in Saskatchewan (see e.g. SuperValu v Alberta
Food & Comercial Workers, Local 401, [1981] 3 CLRBR 412 (WL); Saskatchewan Joint Board
(RWDSU) v Brown Industries (1976) Ltd [1995], SLRBD No 19) and British Columbia (see e.g.
IWA Local 1-357 v Consumer Pallet Ltd, [1974] BCLRBD No 37 (QL)).
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labour law for rules requiring that unions be granted access to workers both at
the workplace and at their homes.120 The Ontario Labour Relations Act already
employs mandatory ballots for some workplaces and card-check for others,
and the two models coexist throughout Canada.121 The novelty in the approach
discussed here lies only in bundling these restrictions on employer discretion and
then linking them with illegal employer behaviour.
Third, the dual regulatory model has the potential to harness the energy and
expertise of private actors in improving workplace practices. Since the result of
proving a breach of the Code would include a more preferential union-organizing
climate, the model includes a built-in incentive for unions and other worker advocates
to help the state uncover and enforce employment law violations. Consistent with a
core objective of the decentred approach, the model aims to harness private actors in
the inspection and enforcement process of public obligations.
Unions might create hotlines for non-union employees to report employment
standards violations if they believed helping those employees prove the violations
will lead them to new members and new bargaining units. Unions might also
represent non-union workers in bringing complaints forward, which would
benefit those workers and improve the quality of representation before the
employment tribunals. If the “sunshine list” of Code violators is posted, unions
could use it to target their organizing resources. Poverty law clinics and worker
activists are already involved in searching out abusive employers and advocating
on employees’ behalf.122 The proposed model creates an incentive for these private
actors to form a private inspectorate and to build bridges to non-union workers
120. For example, there are Canadian laws that require: employers operating in some remote
areas to permit union organizers onto company property for the purposes of conversing with
employees; mall owners to waive property rights to enable unions to contact employees of
mall tenants; and employers or distance workers to provide contact information to enable
union organizing. See discussion in Doorey, “Union Access,” supra note 105. In addition,
labour boards in Canada have ordered employers to grant unions access to the workplace as
a part of a remedial order for violations of labour relations legislation. See e.g. USWA v Baron
Metal Industries Inc, [2001] OLRB Rep 931, 73 CLRBR (2d) 301.
121. Construction employers are governed by a card-check system, whereas other employers are
subject to a mandatory model. See OLRA, supra note 99, ss 128.1 (providing for card-check
certification in the construction sector), 7-10 (providing for governing of all other workplaces
by mandatory ballots).
122. See e.g. Cranford et al, supra note 64; Janice Fine, “Community Unions and the Revival
of the American Labor Movement” (2005) 33:1 Pol & Soc’y 153; Amanda Tattersall, “A
Little Help from Our Friends: Exploring and Understanding when Labor-Community
Coalitions are Likely to Form” (2009) 34:4 Lab Stud J 485; and Janice Fine & Jennifer
Gordon, “Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through partnerships with Workers’
Organizations” (2010) 38:4 Politics & Soc’y 552.
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who are in need of skilled advocacy.123 Canadian unions have already recognized
the need to be more active in defending the interests of non-union workers.124
The proposed model would assist in that regard.
Fourth, there is a good basis to believe that the proposed model could
improve overall compliance with employment standards legislation. Consider an
employer like Wal-Mart. In the United States, Wal-Mart has been found to be
in violation of employment standards laws on multiple occasions amounting to
illegal nonpayment of wages totaling millions of dollars.125 The remedies assessed
consist mostly of monies that should have been paid the employees in the first
place. Although large on their face, these amounts are relatively insignificant to
the most profitable retailer in the world. Despite its violations of employment
laws, Wal-Mart retained all of the rights available to American employers to
campaign against their employees’ unionization efforts, and it exercises these
rights vigorously.
Given Wal-Mart’s well-known aversion to collective bargaining, there is good
reason to believe that the potential of losing the right to campaign against unionization
and to insist on a ballot would have a greater deterrent impact than the existing
threat of back-wage orders and fines.126 The possibility of forfeiting the rights to
campaign against unionization would be expected to influence how a company like
Wal-Mart sets its internal management policies. For example, in a recent decision,
a Wal-Mart manager was dismissed for altering payroll records to avoid recording
overtime pay earned by employees. A Canadian appellate court confirmed a jury
finding that the employee was dismissed without cause because he believed he was
properly implementing a “zero overtime” directive set by Wal-Mart’s head office.127

123. To make these organizations more effective in this role, the state could set aside additional
funding, something Professor Arthurs recommended in Fairness at Work, supra note 2 at 199.
124. For example, in a draft discussion paper issued by the Canadian Auto Workers and the
Communications, Energy, and Paperworkers Union in 2012, included as a key objective for
the labour movement in the future must be finding ways to better advocate on behalf of “all
workers” and not just union members. See “CAW–CEP Discussion Paper” (11 November
2011), online: Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada <http://www.
cep.ca/sites/cep.ca/files/docs/en/120126_CAW-CEP_Discussion_Paper.pdf>.
125. See Joe Schneider & Margaret Cronin Fisk, “Wal-Mart to Pay $54 Million to Settle
Minnesota Suit” Bloomberg News (9 December 2008), online: <http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aTBVXl48DYGQ>. This article reviews several American
decisions in which Wal-Mart was found to have violated employment standards laws,
including a Minnesota judgment finding “over 2 million violations” of wage laws.
126. For a discussion of Wal-Mart’s efforts to resist unionization in Canada and the Unitd States,
see Roy J Adams, “Organizing Wal-Mart: The Canadian Campaign” (2005) 6&7 Just Lab 1.
127. Day v Wal-Mart Canada Inc, 2000 NSCA 127, 188 NSR (2d) 69.

DOOREY, RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE LAW

89

If the remedy for non-payment of statutory overtime included forfeiting all
rights to campaign against unionization at the store, and perhaps a switch to a
card-check model, we can reasonably anticipate that a union-averse employer
(like Wal-Mart) would adjust its policies to emphasize to managers the need
to comply with overtime laws at all costs. For example, a zero overtime policy
might be revised to instruct managers to pay overtime if there is any doubt about
whether an employee is entitled to it. That is a subtle shift in internal policy,
but it can have the effect of shifting the default rule from “do not pay unless
ordered to by an adjudicator” to “err on the side of payment, unless it is clear that
overtime is not payable.” This would be an extremely useful shift in emphasis if
the goal is to improve compliance with overtime laws.
Finally, since the outcome of a finding of non-compliance with employment
laws would be an organizing climate more favourable to union organizing, the
model may facilitate access to collective bargaining. This could energize union
organizers and assist in the slow process of rebuilding the institution of collective
bargaining. Moreover, since only law-breaking employers will experience the
new restrictions on their legal rights to resist unionization, the model specifically
targets the worst workplaces, where workers can most benefit from the protections
offered by unionization and collective bargaining.
For all of these reasons, the model discussed in Part V could improve
compliance with employment laws while facilitating collective bargaining.
Now the bad news: A threat of being unionized will be a hollow one for many
employers who violate employment standards, so the risk of losing legal rights
to resist unionization may have little effect on them. Employers with less than
twenty employees may have little to fear given the persistently low rates of union
density in small workplaces, though perhaps the model could help address this
issue.128 Similarly, the thousands of employees who are excluded from collective
bargaining statutes altogether would not be expected to receive much benefit
from a model that draws power from the risk of unionization, although the
information disclosure requirements could still be useful.
In addition, even if the dual regulatory model did facilitate union
organizing, there is no guarantee that this would translate into long-term

128. For example, the 2009 union density rate in Canada for workplaces with fewer than 20
employees was only 13.3%, compared to 29.7% for workplaces with between 20-99
employees, 40.9% for workplaces with 100-500 employees, and 52.2% for workplaces with
over 500 employees. See Sharanjit Uppal, “Table 2 Union Membership, 2009” Unionization
2010 (29 October 2010), online: Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75001-x/2010110/tables-tableaux/11358/tbl002-eng.htm>.
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sustainable collective bargaining relationships. We need only look to the history
of successful certifications at companies like Wal-Mart or Canada’s chartered
banks, and the subsequent decertifications and closures, to recognize that there
is no necessary correlation between obtaining bargaining rights and achieving
a durable collective bargaining relationship.129 Furthermore, some particularly
union-averse employers might simply shut down if they lost the legal right to
resist unionization or if their employees unionize. Some businesses might be
so concerned about losing their right to resist unionization, and have so little
confidence in their capacity to comply with the Code, that they would just avoid
a jurisdiction that passed laws like these altogether.
These issues reflect systemic limitations of the labour relations model itself,
which are not overcome by the proposal discussed here. More fundamentally, since
that proposal does not alter the power relations in capitalist societies that permit,
if not encourage, a subordinated worker class, it may be that little of substance
will change in terms of employment outcomes. This is a criticism directed from
the left at most modest proposals for workplace law reform. Any legal proposal
pragmatic enough to attract broad political support will be so watered down that
its usefulness is at best limited. Therefore, such proposals simply divert attention
away from more fundamental campaigns to overhaul power relations throughout
society.
Indeed, the left’s objection to the specific decentred approach described in
this paper may run deeper than just the usual criticism against modest reforms
to employment-related statutes. The dual regulatory stream approach does
not challenge the existing premise inherent in the Wagner Act model that it is
acceptable for employers to resist unionization. It simply creates an exception
to that presumption for high-risk employers. This could be seen as legitimizing
employer resistance to collective bargaining precisely at a time when unions and
human rights advocates are deeply engaged in a campaign to push labour rights
as human rights. Many employers and those on the political right would also be
expected to resist the model discussed here. They would reject the premise that
collective bargaining is a valuable and important means for assisting vulnerable
workers. In some corners, the right to resist unionization is considered so

129. In the United States, only 56% of newly certified bargaining units are successful at
bargaining first collective agreements. See John-Paul Ferguson, “The Eyes of the Needles:
A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004” (2008) 62:1 Indus &
Lab Rel Rev 3 at 5; See also Anne Forrest, “Securing the Male Breadwinner: A Feminist
Interpretation of PC 1003” (1997) 52:1 RI 91; and Rosemary Warskett, “Bank Worker
Unionization and the Law” (1988) 25 Stud in Pol Econ’y 41.
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sacrosanct that there can be no justification for its restriction, even in the case of
the worst law-breaking employers.
However, on the one hand, reforms to workplace law are always controversial,
so the presence of strong resistance from some stakeholders should never itself
be a reason to dismiss a reform proposal. On the other hand, there may be good
reasons not to adopt any particular legal reform, whether they take the form
of a decentred regulatory approach or not. The potential contribution of the
decentred approach to regulation is not that it will end heated debates about the
efficacy of workplace laws.
The objective of this article is not to persuade readers that the particular
model discussed in Part V is the only, or even the best, possibility for workplace
law reform. The objective is far more modest. It is to investigate whether there are
any useful insights that can be drawn from the decentred regulation literature for
the future of workplace law. My own conclusion is that the literature does open
up some new ways of thinking about old problems. For that reason alone, there
is value in exploring further how decentred regulation might contribute to the
challenge of identifying ways to move forward with workplace law reform at a
time when there is so little consensus on which path to take.

